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GOVERNMENTS AND SUPPORTING PARTIES: DEFINITIONS AND
CLASSIFICATIONS
J. Blondel
There have so far been few attempts to look closely at
the relationships between governments and the parties which
support them. This could be because the concept of 'party
government' appears to have been given little detailed
consideration, even in the literature which is devoted explicitly 
to the subject (1). For instance, party government has been 
defined, in a somewhat simplified and rather vague manner as "that 
form of societal conflict regulation in which a plurality of 
democratically organised political parties play a relatively 
dominant role both in the socio-political mediation sphere and in 
the actual process of political decision-making (government 
sphere)” (2). Such a 'definition' (if the word applies in this 
case) says little that can be used for practical purposes, since 
what is a 'relatively dominant role' is clearly highly debatable; 
it also seems to assume that a government is either party or non 




























































































The problem of the definition of party government
There are probably many reasons why party government has 
not been given the attention which it merits: among these, one of 
the most important appears to be the tendency, common in the 
literature of the 1970s and 1980s, to view governments as almost 
passive subjects operating under the pressure of a variety of 
forces, among which parties, but also groups and indeed the civil 
service play a major part, a standpoint which corresponded to the 
'corporatism' period in the analysis of political systems: "The 
severely limited role of parties and parliaments in policy-making 
seems to be a fact which can scarcely be disputed in empirical 
terms.... To the extent to which policy-making evades political 
control and guidance, it is determined by the particular interests 
of pressure groups, large enterprises and bureaucracies, while 
general and encompassing interests tend to be neglected." (3). 
Nowhere is the government mentioned at all as a possible 
independent actor. Quite apart from being simplistic in many ways, 
this approach has two specific defects in the context of party 
government. First, it places broadly on the same level parties and 
other groups, while the insertion of parties in the governmental 
machinery is manifestly broader and more wide-ranging: ministerial 
recruitment and ministerial policy are dominated by parties, in 
many cases at least, to an extent that is not achieved or even 
attempted by groups. Second, and more importantly, this view of 
the relationship between governments and supporting parties 




























































































leaders and ministers, are not major actors in the process of 
policy-making and development. At best, this is a hypothesis to 
test, not an assumption to make; as a matter of fact, 
impressionistic evidence suggests on the contrary that many 
governments at least are rather autonomous from the party or 
parties which support them either because these governments are 
allowed by the parties a substantial freedom of manoeuvre or 
because they - and in particular their leaders - control the 
supporting political parties. What has therefore to be undertaken 
is an inquiry into the links which exist between government and 
parties in order to assess where, to what extent, and for what 
reasons governments are relatively autonomous from or on the 
contrary dependent on these supporting parties.
Such an analysis requires in the first instance a precise 
definition of what is meant by party government, however. Perhaps 
the most systematic effort to do so is that of R.S. Katz who 
develops an incremental concept of 'partyness of government' as 
well indeed as a concept of 'party governmentness' (4). He 
mentions three conditions which have to be fulfilled for a 
government to deserve the title, so to speak, of 'party 
government'. These are that "all major governmental decisions must 
be taken by people chosen in elections conducted along party 
lines, or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such 
people", that "policy must be decided within the governing party, 
when there is a "monocolour" government, or by negotiation among 




























































































officials (e.g. cabinet ministers and especially the prime 
minister) must be selected within their parties and be responsible 
to the people through their parties)" (5). R.S. Katz then goes on 
to note that this definition "represents an ideal type, rather 
like but in contrast to Dahl's (1971) type of polyarchy. As such, 
it represents an extreme that may be approximated but is neither 
realised nor realisable in the ultimate sense. It is also a 
multidimensional concept. Thus a particular system may closely 
approximate the ideal type in one respect but not in another" (6).
R.S. Katz's analysis shows that the problem of defining 
party government is complex; perhaps even more interestingly, it 
also suggests that one should look for 'types' of party 
government. It is to the question of defining such 'types', of 
examining the dimensions along which these can be analysed, and of 
determining the political factors which may account for their 
existence that two subsequent papers are devoted (7).
Before undertaking such a task, however, some problems of 
definition, both theoretical and empirical, have to be examined. 
To begin with, two general points need to be made. First, 
government-party relationships are naturally a sub-set of a more 
general question, namely that of the relationship between 
governments and those bodies which are closely and continuously 
attached to them. In the large majority of contemporary polities, 
these bodies are parties, but, even at present, not every country 




























































































governments rely on privileged groups, communal organisations in 
particular, especially those which are ethnic or religious; some 
governments of course also rely or are based on the military. As 
they emerge in a polity (often from within communal groups, but 
also from the military), parties gradually replace these bodies as 
the main channels having a privileged relationship with the 
government; but the relationship between governments and these 
groups will continue to exist for a period: this point is 
important with respect to relatively new parties and party systems 
which are not fully 'consolidated1.
Second, the relationship between government and parties 
is complex because governments and parties are different types of 
bodies, although they attempt to influence each other and are in 
many cases in very close association. Parties are typically large 
organisations, while governments are small bodies of top decision­
makers. They thus complement each other, parties being spread out 
throughout the country, while governments are at the apex of the 
political system: they work together because they need each other. 
Yet they are also in competition, as governments wish to use 
parties to strengthen their support in the nation while parties 
wish to see governments adopt their goals. This opposition 
corresponds to a large extent to the distinction between the 
'representative' and 'mobilising' functions of parties: to the 
extent that parties are 'representative', they attempt to 
influence governments; to the extent that they are mobilising, 




























































































corresponds to an extent to the division between well-established 
and relatively new parties: in the first case, party members and 
even part of the leadership tend to press their views on the 
government; in the second, the party tends to rely on the national 
leadership and therefore to serve as an instrument of governmental 
action. Thus party-government relationships in the context of 
older established parties differ markedly from party-government 
relationships in the context of relatively new parties.
The fact that parties are large and complex organisations 
while governments are relatively compact bodies, even if they 
increased in size in recent years, does not mean only that the 
relationship between governments and parties will never be 
symmetrical; it also means that what has to be understood by party 
policies and by supporting parties is rather unclear and 
unquestionably varied. We can postulate that we know what we mean 
by government though, of course, there are many difficulties 
attached to attempts at defining the concept, both in theory and 
in practice (8); yet it is possible to adopt a relatively simple 
definition based primarily on cabinet members (for Western 
European countries) as well as (for presidential systems in 
particular) on a number of top presidential advisers who have 
cabinet rank. Such a practical definition may not be altogether 
watertight, but it is probably satisfactory for a study of 
government-party relationships. Difficulties are markedly more 




























































































aspects of the problem of party-government relationships, the 
notion of party policy and the notion of supporting party.
Parties as decision-making bodies
The reason why the question of the definition of party 
emerges as a major difficulty is because we are concerned here 
with parties as decision-making bodies rather than with parties as 
organisations. Although there are serious empirical difficulties
in analysing parties as organisations, the theoretical and
specifically definitional problems are limited: we can
circumscribe the bodies which constitute the party, at the
national level as well as lower down the hierarchy, and examine 
their structure and their relationships; we can see what decisions 
these bodies take and conclude for instance that a given party is 
rather centralised while another is rather decentralised. Analyses 
of this type may still not be very advanced; but further progress 
in the field depends essentially on amassing and analysing the 
relevant data.
If we are to examine government-party relationships, on 
the other hand, it is not sufficient to look at parties as 
organisations: one must consider them as decision-making bodies. 
Yet what constitutes a party from a decision-making point of view 
is not altogether clear. The matter is clear in the limit-case of 
a wholly centralised party, such as a Communist party (of the 




























































































executive on a unanimous or near-unanimous basis. If we move away 
from this limit-case, however, what is to be regarded as a party 
decision becomes more problematic.
The difficulty arises for two reasons, which 
paradoxically have the opposite effect. First, the more a party is 
decentralised and indeed factionalised on the basis of 
ideological, personal, or geographical cleavages, the more it is 
difficult to determine which decisions can be regarded as party 
decisions in the full sense of the owrd. In a divided party, for 
instance because they are organised factions, a large number of 
views are aired: if factionalism is very high, it is indeed 
impossible to say which of these views are truly authoritative, as 
each view is likely to be supported by influential members of the 
party. Indeed, the top decision organs are likely to include 
members representing the various factions; as a matter of fact, in 
many cases at least, so will the government, as the examples of 
Japan and Italy indicate. In such a case, almost every policy 
which the government subsequently endorses and implements is 
likely to have originated in one of the factions. Thus, the more 
the party is factionalised, the more the party will appear to have 
been at the origin of governmental decisions, a conclusion which, 
prima facie, seems counterintuitive, since, in such a case, it is 
not the party as such, but elements from the party which are at 




























































































On the other hand, very decentralised parties are also 
unlikely to adopt formally many precise and detailed policies; 
they may not adopt any policies at all, as the example of American 
parties indicates: in this case, the burden of policy-making is 
left nearly entirely to the President and to Congressmen. Thus, 
while many ideas which eventually become government policy may 
originate from the party, very few of these ideas can be regarded 
as having the formal seal of approval of the party as such. Should 
one then say that the party is very influential (because ideas 
originate form it) or that it has little influence (because it 
takes few policy decisions formally)? Should one say in this case 
that the government has or that it does not have substantial 
autonomy of action? In order to solve the dilemma, we have to 
abandon a simple dichotomous distinction and adopt a somewhat more 
complex formula.
As a matter of fact, the operative distinction in this 
respect is provided by the concepts of aggregation and 
articulation. If we consider the two limit-cases, we can say that 
a highly centralised party is highly aggregative (by whatever 
means, including by coercion), while a very decentralised party 
remains at the level of articulation. The highly centralised party 
presents the government, on a plate so to speak, with policies to 
be followed (and it also tends to choose the ministers who will 
implement these policies). The government takes it or leaves it, 
though some leeway may exist at the level of application. If the 




























































































does not, it opposes itself to the party, with the consequence 
that there might be serious conflict between the two bodies. The 
situation is clear-cut.
In the case of decentralised parties, on the contrary, 
nothing is clear-cut: a large number of views are articulated 
within the party, none of these views being truly authoritative at 
the level of the whole party, though they may be authoritative 
within each faction or segment. The party is not in a position to 
aggregate these views: it passes them on, so to speak, to the 
government, who might then do the necessary aggregation. It is no 
longer a question of 'all or nothing' as in the previous case; it 
is a question of 'more or less'. The government may therefore be 
less constrained, though it may often have to act more as a 
compromiser than as an arbiter.
Yet even this description is too simple in that we have 
considered only the limit-cases of fully cantralised and fully 
decentralised parties In practice, most parties constitute 
intermediate cases: they are relatively decentralised. One or more 
factions will try to control the decision-making organs. The 
result might be defined in terms of 'partly authoritative 
policies', in that decisions are taken by the party officially on 
these policies, but that these are contested by a substantial 
minority. The position of the government may then be relatively 
difficult, unless the majority and the minority are stable and 




























































































of the majority and indeed to be composed exclusively of members 
of that majority; this has sometimes been the case in social 
democractic parties in Western Europe. If alignments are more 
fluid, on the other hand, and if the various factions find 
themselves successively in the majority and in the minority, the 
government has typically to follow a more tortuous path, while it 
also puts pressure on the party's decision-making organs. 
Moreover, this situation may often be both complicated and 
simplified by the presence of a coalition: when this is the case, 
the views of other parties have to be considered and, indeed, a 
coalition compact is likely to have been elaborated by the 
coalition partners before the government has come into being. This 
reduces the room for maneouvre of the cabinet, but also helps to 
solve policy-making problems.
It is therefore not realistic to adopt an 'all-or- 
nothing' conception of the nature of decisions in political 
parties. One should on the contrary refer to degrees of 
'authoritativeness' of the various policies on the party of the 
parties supporting the government. At one extreme, fully 
authoritative party policies are those which the party adopts 
(ostensibly at least) unanimously or near-unanimously. At the 
other extreme are the policies suggested in some quarters of the 
party but not formally accepted (nor formally rejected), either 
because formal authoritative mechanisms of decision-making do not 
exist (in the case of the wholly decentralised party) or because 




























































































vote. In between are policies with various levels of 
'authoritativeness', this 'authoritativeness' being measured by 
the extent of support which the policies obtain in the party. 
Moreover, policies supported only by a minority of the party need 
to be taken into account, since they can be taken up by the 
government, and have indeed, in a sense, originated in the party, 
although the government can probably exercise more discretion in 
such cases. One could thus construct an index of party policy 
'authoritativeness' on the basis of the degree of support enjoyed 
by various policies in the party; at least a four- or five-point 
scale would seem to be realistic. One would in this way determine 
more precisely the extent to which policies can be truly described 
as party policies.
The concept of the supporting party
The overall aim of this analysis is to see hoaw far 
parties influence governmental policy and how far governments, on 
the other hand, remain autonomous or even influence party policy. 
The parties which are being examined here are therefore those 
which support the government, not the opposition. Yet, as we found 
for the concept of party decisions, the concept of supporting 
party is more complex than it seems at first sight. Here again, a 
sharp distinction between supporting and 'non-supporting' parties 
corresponds to limit-cases only, namely those in which the number 
of significant parties is small, in which parties are disciplined, 




























































































tends therefore to apply primarily in the 'textbook' British or 
Commonwealth cases. As soon as one deviates from this 'pure' model 
(including in some real-world situations in Britain and in the 
Commonwealth), what is meant by supporting party becomes less 
clear.
Let us first consider the effect of indiscipline on 
support. Indiscipline relates to behaviour in the legislature and 
is therefore concerned with those party members who are 
congressmen or parliamentarians; but it relates also, indirectly 
but yet closely, to the party as a whole, in that the level of 
discipline in the legislature depends on the cohesion of the party 
in the country. If cohesion is strong, discipline will be high; 
indeed, it will be high even if there are factions or 'currents', 
as these will not or will rarely feel able to manifest themselves 
openly and solemnly in a vote. If cohesion is low, discipline will 
be low. Thus parties which are undisciplined have to be 
decentralised (though the converse is not necessarily true): they 
are parties in which there will be typically disagreements about 
policies: support for the government will therefore tend to be 
limited: one can therefore describe these parties as 'partly 
supportive'. If there is a permanent majority-minority cleavage, 
the support is likely to be well-defined in advance; if there is 
not, the extent of support will be more problematic. Governments 
are likely to be unstable and their policies are likely to be 
rejected often. For measurement purposes, one can define an index 




























































































policies which have been adopted by party members in the 
legislature. The matter can be handled in practice in the same way 
as the question of party decisions which we examined earlier.
The question of the number of significant parties may not 
theoretically seem likely to have a direct impact on the nature of 
support; in practice, the impact can be large, as, the more 
parties are involved in supporting a government, the less this 
support is likely to be firm. When the government is based on a 
single party, the degree of commitment of the party will tend to 
be high, at least in most cases and most of the time, even if 
there are divisions in the party. In the overwhelming majority of 
cases, party members are motivated by the underlying desire that 
the party should win the next election.
When a coalition is set up, the degree of commitment of 
each party to the government is lower, except if a party dominates 
the coalition. In general, however, when there is a coalition, 
parties have to make substantial policy concessions in order for 
the government to come into being; this naturally alienates some 
members. If the partners in the coalition have a high level of 
cohesion, discipline will none the less be maintained, but there 
will probably always be a degree of suspicion, with the effect 





























































































Furthermore, support is likely to decrease as the number 
of parties in the coalition is large. In a two-party coalition, 
the refusal by one party to agree to a particular policy is likely 
to provoke the end of the coalition; this may not be the case if 
there are three or more partners, especially if the party which is 
in disagreement is a small one. The matter may be treated as an 
incident (as can be a case of occasional lack of discipline in a 
single party government). Yet the fact that this type of situation 
may occur suggests that 'support1, in the context of a coalition 
and in particular a multi-party coalition, is less firm than in 
the context of single-party governments.
So far, we assumed that the party or parties in the 
government commanded a majority in the legislature, whether in a 
presidential or in a parliamentary context: this is of course far 
from being always the case. In presidential systems, the party of 
the President may not be the party of the majority in the 
Congress: this is frequently the case, as is well-known, in the 
United States. In parliamentary systems, minority governments are 
relatively frequent (9).
Minority governments are of many types: there are near­
majority governments and true minority governments; a few are 
technical cabinets appointed to solve a particular problem. The 
distinction which is most relevant from the point of view of 
support, however, is that between minority governments set up 



























































































working governmental majority and minority governments which use 
different majorities for different policies in order to continue 
in being.
The first of these last two types can be regarded as a 
weaker former of coalition in which one of more of the coalition 
partners chooses not to join the government (10). One or more 
parties support the government and at least proclaim that they 
intend to do so for a substantial period. In such cases, policy 
trade-offs occur between the government and the parties which do 
not join the cabinet; these trade-offs are also known. The 
arrangement is fairly solid, though the costs of withdrawing 
support are smaller than if the party belonged to the government.
The level of support is lower and less clear when a 
minority government has to find a different majority for each 
policy it puts forward. Yet this type of situation occurs fairly 
frequently, either when a party has obtained a near-majority at a 
general election (in a cabinet system) or, in a presidential 
context, if the party of the President does not have a majority in 
the legislature. Some governments are ideologically located in 
such a way that they can hope for the support of small parties on 
their Left or Right, depending on the circumstances. At first 
sight, in cases of this kind, it seems wrong to claim that the 
parties which vote occasionally for governmental policies truly 
'support' the cabinet; yet they do provide some support. Indeed, 




























































































these votes: these parties have therefore some influence on 
governmental policy. Furthermore, the cabinet almost certainly 
anticipates the reactions of these parties to an extent and 
fashions its policies in such a way as to be able to obtain, when 
needed, the support required. These are therefore cases of 
'partial support', somewhat analogous to those encountered earlier 
with respect to parties which lack discipline in the legislature.
There is thus a substantial range of types of support. 
Yet there is still a more extreme case, namely that of the 
opposition parties themselves. In many cases at least, the 
opposition does not vote systematically and all the time against 
the government; there may indeed be important occasions (with 
respect to foreign affairs for instance or in the context of 
national emergencies) when the opposition supports the government. 
As a matter of fact, if the opposition is not very disciplined, at 
least a proportion of its members may vote for many of the 
government's proposals. Moreover, in respect to the opposition as 
well as for parties which formally give support, the government 
may have to make deals in order to see a particular policy adopted 
on a consensual basis. The government may make policy concessions 
and accept proposals from the opposition parties. These are thus 
in some way involved in the policy-making process, in a limited 





























































































The concept of supporting party needs therefore to be 
regarded, not as dichotomous, but as incremental: parties support 
more or less both governmental policies and the government in 
general. In some limit-cases they support fully the government 
(the textbook British or Commonwealth situations) or oppose it 
fully (as extremist anti-system parties may do, for instance); but 
many other cases are intermediate: this occurs, as we saw, if 
parties are not very disciplined, coalitions are large, or there 
is a minority the government. These cases of support have to be 
recognised as what they are, namely as cases of 'partial support'. 
The extent of the support can indeed be measured by reference to 
the proportion of cases where it occurs, either within a party 
lacking discipline or among parties which are more or less closely 
related to the government. If one adopts here also a four- or 
five- point scale, it becomes possible to obtain a realistic 
picture of the general level, type, and extent of support given by 
parties to governments.
++++++++
Government-party relationships are a central topic in 
democratic societies (as well indeed as in non-democratic
polities); but this central topic can only be examined 
systematically by going beyond the basic impression that parties 
develop programmes which, ideally at least, should be implemented 
by the governments which these parties support. Parties may not 




























































































fields only; moreover, parties may speak with more than one voice. 
Parties may also be related to governments in different ways: the 
support which they give may be tight or loose, permanent or 
occasional. We have therefore to monitor and measure these 
variations: if this is done, we can look forward to a markedly 
better understanding of the many forms which the relationship 
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